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Abstract: 
This paper examines the accuracy of equity analysts who provide earnings forecasts for 
European companies.  We find strong evidence of institutional bias in analysts’ forecasts, 
specifically, when analysts move between sell-side employers and independent employers, 
they issue more accurate forecasts while they are employed by independent firms.  Moreover, 
these differences persist when we hold constant the set of firms these mobile analysts 
research.  We find statistically significant differences in the forecast accuracy of sell-side 
and independent analysts.  The optimistic bias of sell-side analysts appears to be related to 
underwriting activity.  Analysts employed by lead underwriters produce less accurate 
forecasts for newly public companies than do either buy-side or independent analysts.  The 
optimistic bias persists for a five-year period following an IPO.   
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1. Introduction 
 
In his testimony to the U.S. Senate, in June, 2002, New York State Attorney 
General, Eliot Spitzer, argued that the investment advice Merrill Lynch offered its 
clients was tainted and plagued by conflicts of interest.  Equity analysts at times 
functioned as sales representatives for the firm’s investment bankers.  Analysts 
frequently stated private opinions that were at odds with their public assessments of 
stocks.  Moreover, compensation for analysts was tied to the success of investment 
banking activities, rather than the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
 
Six months after Spitzer’s testimony to Congress, ten of Wall Street’s largest firms 
agreed to pay $1.4 billion to settle allegations by federal and state regulators that 
they provided misleading investment advice to customers. As part of the settlement, 
Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, and Credit Suisse First Boston all 
agreed to separate their equity research from investment banking activities.  They 
also agreed to spend $450 million to develop “independent” research.  Conventional 
wisdom argues that independent research is better than sell-side (investment 
banking) research.  We wish to test this hypothesis. 
 
We develop a novel methodology for testing whether analyst bias results from 
institutional factors (such as conflicts of interest attributable to analyst-employer 
activities) or individual analyst factors (such as firm selection, analyst productivity 
and forecast age).  We study a subset of mobile analysts who work at multiple 
analyst-employers during their careers.  We examine whether the forecast accuracy 
of these mobile analysts changes as they move from one analyst-employer to 
another. 
 
We also develop a new way of classifying equity analysts based on the activities of 
their employers.  We consider three employer classes (sell-side, buy-side and 
independent firms) and seven employer activity groups: active underwriters, 
underwriters, syndicate members, asset managers, non-underwriting brokers, non-
underwriting banks and pure research firms.  We test for differences in forecast 
quality across analyst-employer classes and activity groups. 
 
We find that when analysts move between sell-side employers and independent 
employers, they issue more accurate forecasts while they are employed by 
independent firms.  Moreover, these differences persist when we hold constant the 
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set of firms these mobile analysts research.  These results are consistent with 
institutional factors contributing to bias. 
 
We provide evidence that an analyst’s accuracy is related to the employer class at 
which she begins her career.  Analysts who start their careers at buy-side employers 
do not suffer from institutional biases.  On the other hand, analysts who start their 
careers at either sell-side or independent employers appear to be susceptible to 
institutional biases as they move from one employer class to another.   
 
The optimistic bias of sell-side analysts appears to be related to underwriting 
activity.  We find that analysts employed by lead underwriters produce more 
optimistic forecasts for newly public companies than do either buy-side or 
independent analysts.  The optimistic bias of analysts employed by lead underwriters 
persists for a five-year period following an IPO. 
 
We examine the determinants of analyst forecast errors.  Consistent with 
institutional biases impacting analyst accuracy, we find that forecast errors increase 
when the analyst is employed by a sell-side firm and decrease when the analyst is 
employed by an independent firm.  The analyst-employer class at which an analyst 
begins her career is also important in explaining forecast errors.  Forecast errors 
increase when the analyst begins her career at a sell-side firm and decrease when the 
analyst begins her career at either a buy-side or independent firm. 
 
We find that analysts who research European companies exhibit the same optimistic 
bias in their earnings forecasts as their peers who examine U.S. companies.  Over 
the period 1988 – 2005, the mean forecast error is 13.6%.  Independent analysts 
produce the most accurate forecasts and sell-side analysts produce the least accurate 
forecasts.  We find that forecast accuracy varies substantially within the sell-side 
and independent analyst-employer classes.  Analysts affiliated with active 
underwriters are more accurate and less optimistic than analysts affiliated with 
syndicate members.  On the other hand, analysts who are employed by non-
underwriting banks or brokers are more accurate and less optimistic than analysts 
employed by pure research firms. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews the literature.  
Section III describes our methodology and data set.  Our empirical results appear in 
Section IV.  Section V concludes the paper. 
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2.  Literature Review 
 
Do equity analysts issue biased forecasts?  Many researchers conclude so.  Analyst 
forecasting errors are large and display an optimistic bias (Dreman and Berry, 1995; 
Brown, 1997). Analysts have a tendency to herd, where herding is defined as 
“excessive agreement” among forecasts and recommendations (Welch, 2000).  
Stock recommendation changes are sticky in one direction, with analysts reluctant to 
downgrade securities (Conrad, Cornell, Landsman and Rountree, 2006).  Moreover, 
there is evidence that analysts collude with firms to play an “earnings-guidance 
game,” where optimistic forecasts are issued at the start of the year and then ‘walked 
down’ to a level that firms can beat by the end of the year (Richardson, Teoh and 
Wysocki, 2004, Brown, 2000, Matsumoto, 2002 and Thalassinos et al., 2012).   
 
Several competing explanations have been offered for analyst forecast bias.  Some 
researchers conclude that bias is related to investment banking or brokerage 
activities.  Analysts are biased because of conflicts of interest introduced by 
underwriting relationships (Michaely and Womack, 1999, Bradshaw, Richardson 
and Sloan, 2003). Compared to independent analysts, analysts affiliated with 
investment banks offer inferior stock recommendations (Cliff, 2007).  Moreover, 
investor trading strategies based on independent research are more profitable than 
those based on affiliated research, with the exception of sell recommendations 
(Barber, Lehavy and Trueman, 2005).  Alternatively, sales and trading activities 
induce bias.  Analysts at pure brokerage firms are more optimistic than those 
employed by underwriters (Cowen, Groysberg and Healy, 2005).  
 
Other researchers conclude that forecast bias is not related to conflicts associated 
with analyst-employer activities.  After controlling for forecast age, firm resources 
and analyst workloads, there is no relation between forecast bias and investment 
banking/brokerage activities (Agrawal and Chen, 2008).  There is no evidence that 
the lucrative fees investment banks earn on mergers and acquisition advisory work 
influence analyst objectivity (Kolasinski and Kothari, 2008).  Moreover, there is no 
evidence that analysts show bias towards firms that file for bankruptcy (Clarke, 
Ferris, Jayaraman and Lee, 2005). In fact, analysts employed by investment banks 
produce less optimistic and more accurate earnings forecasts than analysts employed 
by independent research firms (Jacob, Rock and Weber, 2003) or brokerages 
(Clarke, Khorana, Patel and Rau, 2004).     
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If bias isn’t related to analyst-employer conflicts, what is its cause?  Bias may be 
rational.   Under certain analyst-utility assumptions, forecasts which minimize 
expected error are characterized by an optimistic bias (Lim, 2001).  Bias might 
result from the use of judgmental heuristics (Affleck-Graves, Davis and Mendenhall, 
1990), or from analysts catering to investor beliefs (Lai, 2004).  Alternatively, 
estimates of bias might be imprecise because of data censorship (Hayes and Levine, 
2003), or asymmetries in the distribution of forecast errors (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 
2003).  Bias might result from earnings skewness (Gu and Wu, 2003) or variations 
in disclosure requirements (Higgins, 1998). It is also possible that bias occurs 
naturally in certain incentive contracts that account for the interaction between 
analysts and firm managers (Mittendorf and Zhang, 2005).   
 
Are analysts rewarded for forecast accuracy? Accuracy is rewarded, but so is 
optimism.   Controlling for accuracy, analysts who are optimistic are more likely to 
experience favorable job changes (Hong and Kubik, 2003).  In fact, analysts face a 
trade-off between being optimistic and generating short-term trades for their 
employers or being accurate and cultivating a reputation for accuracy that generates 
long-term trades (Jackson, 2005).  Although buy recommendations generate 
increased trading activity, analysts cannot generate trades for their employers by 
simply adding error to their forecasts (Irvine, 2004).    
 
Up until its repeal by Congress in 1999, Glass-Steagall legislation had a significant 
impact on U.S. financial firms and their activities.  No such legislation restricted 
banking activities in Europe.  Differences in the regulatory environments for U.S. 
and European banks, and differences in the banking environments across European 
countries make the question of analyst bias a particularly interesting international 
issue.  In this paper, we seek to shed light on this issue.   
 
3.  Methodology 
 
We measure analyst independence by focusing on the activities of analyst-
employers.  We consider three analyst-employer classes: sell-side firms, buy-side 
firms and independent firms.  Sell-side firms are investment banks that engage in 
trading and underwriting activities for corporate clients.  Buy-side firms are asset 
management firms engaged primarily in investment activities for retail and 
institutional customers.  Buy-side firms include pension funds and mutual funds.  
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Independent firms are pure research firms, brokers or banks that do not underwrite 
securities or manage money.   
 
We attempt to isolate the institutional factors that might induce forecast bias by 
tracking analysts through their careers and by focusing on the forecast accuracy of 
mobile analysts who move from one class of analyst-employer to another.  For 
example, Jane Smith might start her career as an analyst at Deutsche Bank, an 
investment bank.  Mid-way through her career, Jane Smith might change employers, 
leaving Deutsche Bank for Cordius Asset Management.  At a later date, Jane Smith 
might change employers again, leaving Cordius Asset Management for Limmat, an 
independent research firm.  Throughout her career, Jane Smith might specialize in 
the analysis of food companies, such as Nestlé.  One question we can ask is whether 
Jane Smith’s forecasts of Nestlé’s earnings change as she changes employers.  If so, 
it might be because institutional biases at Deutsche Bank or Cordius Asset 
Management impact Ms. Smith’s objectivity.  For example, if Deutsche Bank is 
underwriting a debt issue for Nestlé, or if Deutsche Bank holds shares of Nestlé 
stock, then Ms. Smith’s analysis of Nestlé might be tainted by her employer’s 
relationship with Nestlé.  She might be more inclined to issue a favorable earnings 
forecast for Nestlé when Deutsche Bank is her employer, just to keep her employer’s 
customer satisfied. 
 
We conduct our analysis with the help of two large databases: I/B/E/S and SDC.  
The Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) reports the earnings forecasts 
and stock recommendations of an incomplete set of equity analysts employed by 
sell-side firms, buy-side firms and independent research firms.  We collect 
information for all analysts who research European companies over the period 1988 
through 2005. The Securities Data Corporation (SDC) reports the stock and bond 
offerings of a comprehensive set of publicly traded corporations.  All underwriting 
relationships for all security issues are documented in this database 
 
We begin our analysis with 352 distinct analyst-employer names from the I/B/E/S 
database.  A single analyst-employer might use multiple names to distinguish among 
company subsidiaries.  We group the 352 distinct analyst-employer names into 245 
distinct families.  For example, Rabo Securities belongs to the same family as Rabo 
Effectenbank NV and Darier, Hentsch & Cie belongs to the same family as 
Lombard, Odier, Darier, Hentsch & Cie.   
 
9 
Forecast Bias and 
Enterprises Analyst Independence 
 
We use SDC data for all publicly issued European debt and equity securities over 
the period 1988 – 2005 to determine whether an analyst-employer is an underwriter.  
Active underwriters are those who rank in the top-ten based on the number of 
transactions in which they serve as lead (or co-lead) underwriter.  Over the sample 
period we examine, the following ten firms comprise the active underwriting class:  
Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank, DG Bank, Swiss Bank Corp., 
Commerzbank, Dresdner Bank, Suedwestdeutsche Landesbank, BNP Paribas, UBS 
and WestLB.  Underwriters are those who serve as lead (or co-lead) underwriter on 
at least one transaction over the sample period.  We identify 107 analyst-employer 
families as underwriters.  Some of these firms (e.g., Goldman Sachs, Morgan 
Stanley, Merrill Lynch) are active underwriters in the U.S., but they do not make the 
top-ten list in Europe.   
 
Next, we identify 35 analyst-employer families that do not lead (or co-lead) 
underwrite but that do serve as underwriting syndicate members on at least one 
transaction over the sample period.  This group includes firms such as Bear Stearns 
and Daiwa Securities.   
 
The remaining 94 analyst-employer families are categorized individually as brokers 
(40), asset managers (19), non-underwriting banks (20), and pure research firms (10) 
based on their principal business activity as revealed in financial statements (where 
available), SEC registration lists, corporate websites and Nelson’s Directory of 
Investment Research.  We are unable to classify 5 analyst-employer names.  
 
We combine the seven activity groups into three analyst-employer classes as 
follows.  Active underwriters, underwriters and syndicate members are combined to 
form a sell-side class.  Asset managers belong to the buy-side class.  Brokers, non-
underwriting banks and pure research firms are combined to form an independent 
employer class.   
 
In distinguishing among sell-side, buy-side and independent firms, we err on the 
side of our null hypothesis that there are no differences in forecast accuracy across 
analyst-employer classes.  Our sell-side class includes analyst-employers that 
participate as underwriters on only one or two transactions.  These firms might 
classify themselves, at least at some point in time, as independent firms, mostly in 
the business of providing research.  By labeling these firms underwriters, we bias 
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our tests against finding differences in forecast quality across analyst-employer 
classes. 
 
We examine the accuracy of analyst forecasts across analyst-employer classes and 
activity groups.  The most commonly used measure of forecast accuracy is forecast 
error, which measures the difference between forecasted earnings and actual firm 
earnings.  Following Hong and Kubik (2003), we scale our measure of forecast error 
by the price of the stock at the time of an earnings announcement.  Other variables 
which we use in our analysis include firm size (the natural log of a firm’s market 
capitalization), analyst productivity (the number of distinct firms that an analyst 
researches in the year a forecast is made), forecast immediacy (the number of days 
from the first earnings estimate to the forecast revision), and a measure of analyst 
coverage known as residual analyst coverage.  This is computed by regressing the 
natural logarithm of (1 + # of analysts covering a firm) on the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization, and using the residuals from this regression as a proxy for the 
incremental effect of analyst coverage (See Bhushan, 1989; Brennan and Hughes, 
1991; and Hong et al., 2000).   
 
We focus on analyst forecasts rather than stock recommendations because the latter 
measure of analyst sentiment is sticky.  When analysts initiate coverage for a firm, 
they often produce a report that lists a one-year (or longer-term) share price target.  
Recommendations often accompany and summarize these price targets.  Analysts 
may be reluctant to revise their recommendations frequently and appear flippant.  In 
fact, Barber et al. (2006) show that nearly half of all recommendations are left 
unchanged when they are revisited, approximately 300 days after they were first 
made.  Earnings forecasts, in contrast, are generally more responsive to short-term 
news events.  Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki (2004) show that analysts often revise 
their earnings forecasts on a quarterly (or monthly) basis.  Moreover, McKnight and 
Todd (2006) show that a trading strategy based on forecast revisions dominates one 
based on recommendations or changes in recommendations.     
 
4.  Empirical Results 
 
Summary statistics for our European data appear in Table 1.  This table reports 
descriptive statistics on analysts and earnings forecasts for three broad classes of 
analyst-employers (sell-side, buy-side and independent firms) for the period January 
1988 through May 2005 for all I/B/E/S reported firms within 16 European countries 
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(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom). 
Panel A reports forecast activity by year and by analyst-employer class; Panel B 
examines analyst-employer productivity; Panel C considers analyst productivity; 
Panel D examines firm-country characteristics.  In this table and all subsequent 
tables, we trim the data at the 1% and 99% percentiles to reduce the impact of 
outliers and data errors.   
 
Table. 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
We see in Panel A that equity analysts generated more than 2 million earnings 
forecasts for European firms over the period 1988 – 2005.  Most of the forecasts 
were made by analysts employed by sell-side firms.  Less than 10% of the forecasts 
were made by buy-side or independent analysts.  Because I/B/E/S does not purport 
to collect data from all research analysts, we cannot say whether the reported 
Panel A: Analyst-Employers, Analysts and Estimates 
 Sell-side  Buy-side  Independent  
 
Year 
Analyst- 
Employers 
Distinct 
Analysts 
 
Estimates 
Analyst-
Employers 
Distinct 
Analysts 
 
Estimates 
Analyst-
Employers 
Distinct 
Analysts 
 
Estimates 
1988 57 387 17,219 4 29 267 16 102 1,831 
1989 88 551 36,994 4 50 514 20 130 3,623 
1990 107 799 49,940 4 67 951 23 184 5,264 
1991 126 1,172 66,964 5 69 1,672 27 213 7,022 
1992 149 1,396 83,279 8 87 2,363 37 247 8,473 
1993 165 1,829 116,109 8 78 2,733 42 285 10,191 
1994 172 2,018 57,716 9 72 1,075 41 276 4,934 
1995 177 2,717 40,320 12 58 622 39 324 4,456 
1996 177 3,652 82,461 13 80 1,354 40 380 10,167 
1997 181 4,647 126,190 14 113 2,305 46 453 16,140 
1998 185 5,054 139,631 14 114 2,995 51 456 17,385 
1999 186 5,410 148,059 14 127 3,444 47 398 15,150 
2000 174 5,692 149,507 13 135 2,905 49 425 13,031 
2001 164 6,018 144,811 11 124 2,539 42 408 12,052 
2002 151 6,070 153,961 10 103 2,150 36 373 13,158 
2003 123 5,947 168,096 8 82 2,077 33 374 12,679 
2004 112 5,695 181,250 6 66 1,454 27 351 12,238 
2005 115 4,938 155,605 5 40 995 25 321 9,489 
TOTAL   1,918,112   32,415   162,298 
Families 152   19   70   
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frequencies across analyst-employer classes are representative of all research 
activity.   
Reported forecast activity generally increases from 1988 through 1993, then it 
declines dramatically.  The number of reported estimates generally increases 
through the mid- and late 1990s, then drops off again in 2000 or 2001.   Reporting 
activity generally follows the world economy, with a lag.  During recessions, 
research activity is typically reduced.   
 
Over the sample period, there are 152 distinct sell-side analyst-employers, 19 
distinct buy-side analyst-employers and 70 distinct independent analyst-employers, 
once we aggregate at the family level.  The number of un-aggregated analyst-
employers providing estimates generally peaks in the late 1990s.  A similar pattern 
obtains for the number of distinct analysts, although the number of distinct sell-side 
analysts peaks in 2002. 
 
Table. 1: Descriptive Statistics (cont’d) 
Panel B: Analyst-Employer Productivity 
 Sell-side Buy-side Independent 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Mean 
Analysts 
per 
Employer 
 
 
Mean 
Estimates 
per 
Analyst 
Mean 
Estimates 
per 
Analyst 
per Firm 
per Year 
 
 
Mean 
Analysts 
per 
Employer 
 
 
Mean 
Estimates 
per 
Analyst 
Mean 
Estimates 
per 
Analyst 
per Firm 
per Year 
 
 
Mean 
Analysts 
per 
Employer 
 
 
Mean 
Estimates 
per 
Analyst 
Mean 
Estimates 
per 
Analyst 
per Firm 
per Year 
1988 15.5 44.5 3.3 7.5 9.2 2.0 7.9 17.3 2.4 
1989 14.6 67.1 4.7 13.3 10.3 1.8 8.7 27.9 2.8 
1990 16.7 62.5 5.1 19.0 14.2 2.4 11.0 28.6 2.8 
1991 19.5 57.1 5.1 16.6 24.2 3.0 10.9 33.0 3.0 
1992 19.6 59.7 5.4 13.6 27.2 3.5 9.1 34.3 2.9 
1993 21.0 63.5 6.7 12.4 35.0 4.3 9.1 35.8 3.3 
1994 19.7 28.6 4.1 9.8 14.9 2.5 8.6 17.9 2.5 
1995 21.7 14.8 2.4 5.3 10.7 2.2 9.2 13.8 2.0 
1996 25.6 22.8 3.0 6.9 16.9 2.7 10.4 26.8 2.8 
1997 31.2 27.2 3.4 8.5 20.4 2.8 10.6 35.6 3.6 
1998 31.3 27.6 3.6 8.4 26.3 3.0 9.4 38.1 3.7 
1999 31.3 27.4 3.8 9.2 27.1 3.2 8.6 38.1 3.4 
2000 34.6 26.3 4.0 10.5 21.5 3.0 8.8 30.7 3.3 
2001 38.6 24.1 4.0 11.3 20.5 2.8 9.8 29.5 3.6 
2002 42.4 25.4 4.2 10.3 20.9 2.6 10.4 35.3 4.6 
2003 51.0 28.3 4.6 10.3 25.3 2.7 11.4 33.9 4.4 
2004 54.2 31.8 5.2 11.0 22.0 3.0 13.1 34.9 4.8 
2005 45.9 31.5 5.9 8.0 24.9 4.7 13.0 29.6 4.6 
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In Panel B, we see that sell-side firms employ many more analysts on average than 
either buy-side or independent firms.  Time-series mean values for the number of 
analysts per employer are 29.7, 10.7 and 10.0 respectively for sell-side, buy-side and 
independent firms.  We also see that sell-side analysts generate more estimates on 
average than either buy-side or independent analysts.  Time-series mean values for 
the number of estimates per analyst are 37.2, 20.6, and 30.1 respectively for sell-
side, buy-side and independent analysts.  At the firm level, consistent with the 
pattern observed in Panel A, mean estimates per analyst generally increase from 
1988 – 1993, then decline dramatically.  Productivity recovers in the mid- and late 
1990s, then declines again in 2000 or 2001. 
 
Table. 1: Descriptive Statistics (cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Analyst Productivity 
 Sell-side Buy-side Independent 
 
 
 
Year 
Mean 
Firms 
Per 
Analyst 
 
Mean 
Estimate
s Per 
Firm 
Mean 
Days to 
Forecast 
Revision 
Mean 
Firms 
Per 
Analyst 
 
Mean 
Estimate
s Per 
Firm 
Mean 
Days to 
Forecast 
Revision 
Mean 
Firms 
Per 
Analyst 
 
Mean 
Estimate
s Per 
Firm 
Mea
n 
Days 
to 
Fore
cast 
Revis
ion 
1988 13.3 8.8 103 4.7 2.8 139 7.3 2.7 112 
1989 14.4 16.1 96 5.6 2.2 147 9.9 3.8 101 
1990 12.4 21.4 90 5.9 3.0 119 10.2 4.3 110 
1991 11.3 25.1 86 8.1 3.8 98 11.0 5.1 100 
1992 11.0 30.4 84 7.7 4.8 84 11.8 4.8 93 
1993 9.5 44.9 86 8.2 5.6 83 10.8 6.0 90 
1994 7.0 26.1 86 5.9 3.1 99 7.2 4.4 98 
1995 6.2 14.1 109 5.0 2.5 130 7.0 3.0 132 
1996 7.7 27.5 112 6.3 3.2 122 9.7 5.1 121 
1997 7.9 38.1 109 7.4 3.6 113 9.8 7.2 115 
1998 7.6 42.1 108 8.8 4.2 115 10.5 7.6 111 
1999 7.2 43.2 101 8.4 4.7 120 11.2 7.1 110 
2000 6.6 44.8 94 7.2 4.1 110 9.3 7.0 104 
2001 6.0 47.5 87 7.3 4.3 100 8.2 8.2 92 
2002 6.1 54.7 84 8.2 4.2 96 7.7 10.0 82 
2003 6.1 62.5 78 9.5 4.4 89 7.8 9.8 79 
2004 6.1 77.7 73 7.3 4.3 78 7.3 10.7 76 
2005 5.4 96.0 69 5.3 5.9 66 6.4 11.4 71 
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In Panel C, we see that buy-side analysts typically provide earnings forecasts for 5 - 
8 firms, while sell-side and independent analysts typically cover more firms.   Time-
series mean values for the number of firms per analyst are 8.4, 7.0 and 9.1 for sell-
side, buy-side and independent analysts.  The statistics on analyst productivity 
mirror similar statistics for analyst-employer productivity, with productivity 
generally rising between 1988 and 1993, and then declining.  Productivity recovers 
in the mid- and late 1990s, and then declines again in 2000 or 2001.   
 
In Panel C we see that sell-side analysts typically revise their earnings forecasts 
before either buy-side or independent analysts.  Time-series mean values for the 
number of days to the first forecast revision are 91.9, 106.0 and 99.8 for sell-side, 
buy-side and independent analysts.  
 
Table. 1: Descriptive Statistics (cont’d) 
 
Panel D: Firm-Country Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
Country 
Name 
 
 
 
 
# of 
Firms 
 
 
 
Distinct 
Analyst- 
Employers 
 
 
 
 
Distinct 
Analysts 
 
 
 
 
 
Estimates 
 
 
Mean 
Analysts 
per 
Firm 
Mean 
Estimates 
per 
Analyst 
per Firm 
per Year 
 
 
 
Mean 
Forecast 
Error 
 
 
Mean 
Days 
to 
Forec
ast 
Revisi
on 
Austria 141 71 580 20,627 13.6 3.1 0.126 110 
Belgium 164 107 1156 50,352 22.6 4.0 0.363 93 
Germany 903 126 3514 255,754 22.5 3.7 0.090 101 
Spain 255 103 1728 112,437 35.6 3.8 0.809 100 
France 957 122 3925 393,894 29.6 4.2 0.103 87 
Greece 99 23 143 3,847 5.0 2.8 0.335 107 
Italy 370 110 1848 81,483 23.5 3.3 0.065 102 
Netherlands 283 126 2442 180,385 44.7 4.1 0.070 95 
Portugal 98 50 469 12,650 14.2 3.1 1.501 100 
Switzerland 292 124 1974 142,906 30.0 4.5 0.076 96 
Turkey 106 22 128 4,519 6.5 2.3 0.058 108 
United 
Kingdom 2482 132 4483 557,152 15.6 4.6 0.067 89 
Denmark 278 79 895 62,596 13.3 4.9 0.063 89 
Finland 202 95 1026 61,447 21.3 4.4 0.111 80 
Norway 254 66 990 68,835 15.4 5.4 0.127 67 
Sweden 463 120 1809 118,926 16.3 4.9 0.065 74 
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Panel D reports the distribution of the earnings forecasts by firm-country.  Most of 
the forecasts cover British, French and German firms.  The data for Greece and 
Turkey are sparse, reflecting a lack of depth in the equity markets in these countries. 
 
There is considerable cross-sectional variation in analyst coverage and forecast 
errors.  Dutch firms enjoy the highest analyst coverage, while firms in Greece and 
Turkey are sparsely covered. Estimates for Norwegian firms are revised most 
frequently (and most quickly) and estimates for Turkish firms are revised least 
frequently.  Mean forecast errors are highest in Portugal and Spain and lowest in 
Turkey and Denmark. 
 
We continue our analysis in Table 2, where we report mean forecast errors for each 
of the seven analyst-employer activity groups.  This table reports statistics on 
analyst-employer families, estimates and forecast errors for seven analyst-employer 
activity groups for the period January 1988 through May 2005 for all I/B/E/S 
reported firms within 16 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom).   
 
For the full sample (2,127,810 observations) the mean forecast error is 13.60%.  
There is quite a bit of variation across analyst-employer activity groups.  For each 
group, we report the t-statistic associated with the null hypothesis that the activity 
group mean forecast error does not differ from the sample mean forecast error. 
   
Table. 2: Forecast Errors by Analyst-Employer Activity Groups 
 
 
Analyst-Employer 
# of 
Distinct 
Families 
 
# of 
Estimates 
Mean 
Forecast 
Error 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
 
t-stat 
Active Underwriters 10 519,569 .1316 .8114 -3.50* 
Underwriters 107 1,268,896 .1411 .8398 5.47* 
Syndicate Members 35 129,647 .1367 .7632 0.31 
Asset Managers 19 32,415 .1311 .7285 1.20 
Brokers 40 134,629 .0933 .5439 -26.95* 
Banks 20 27,412 .1025 .5313 -10.28* 
Pure Research 10 15,242 .2965 1.5818 12.46* 
All 241 2,127,810 .1360 .8158  
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Note: Forecast error is the difference between predicted earnings per share and actual earnings per 
share, scaled by the stock price at the time of the earnings announcement.  A t-statistic is reported 
that tests the null hypothesis that the mean forecast error within an activity group differs from the 
sample mean forecast error.  * (**) [***] denotes significance at 1% (5%) and [10%] levels. 
 
Most of the earnings forecasts come from underwriters (1,268,896 observations) or 
active underwriters (519,569 observations).  Compared to the sample mean, active 
underwriters (the top ten) generate more accurate and less optimistic earnings 
forecasts, while underwriters generate less accurate and more optimistic earnings 
forecasts.  The forecasts of syndicate members resemble the sample mean. 
 
The mean forecast error for buy-side firms (asset managers) is 13.11%, which 
resembles the global mean.  Within the independent analyst-employer class, we 
examine brokers, banks and pure research firms. Compared to the sample mean 
forecast error, brokers, on average, generate more accurate and less optimistic 
forecasts with a mean forecast error of 9.33%.  This result is at odds with U.S. 
evidence that analysts at pure brokerage firms are more optimistic than those 
employed by underwriters (Cowen, Groysberg and Healy, 2005).  Banks resemble 
brokers in that their forecasts are more accurate and less optimistic than the sample 
mean.  Pure research firms generate forecasts that are significantly more optimistic 
than the sample mean.  In fact, pure research firms produce the least accurate 
forecasts. 
 
When we aggregate the seven analyst-employer activity groups into the three major 
classes (sell-side firms, buy-side firms and independent firms), we find that the 
independent analysts produce statistically smaller forecast errors. Our European 
results provide a stark contrast to U.S. evidence that sell-side analysts produce less 
optimistic and more accurate earnings forecasts than independent analysts (Jacob, 
Rock and Weber, 2003).  Our results are consistent with U.S. evidence that sell-side 
analysts offer inferior stock recommendations (Cliff, 2007). 
 
In Table 3, we examine the movement of analysts from one employer class to 
another.  This table reports analyst-employer transition frequencies for analysts 
providing earnings forecasts for the period January 1988 through May 2005 for all 
I/B/E/S reported firms within 16 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom).  The matrix counts the number 
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of distinct analysts moving between sell-side, buy-side and independent analyst-
employers.  The diagonal reports the number of stationary analysts. 
 
Table. 3: Analyst-Employer Transition Frequencies 
 
                           To:   
From:                Sell-Side Buy-Side Independent 
Sell-side 8,970 26 110 
Buy-side 18 155 2 
Independent 87 1 637 
 
Most analysts are stationary within an employer class, as documented by the large 
values along the diagonal of the matrix.  There are 8,970 stationary sell-side 
analysts, 155 stationary buy-side analysts and 637 stationary independent analysts.  
Although analysts may routinely move from one investment bank to another, as 
documented by Hong and Kubik (2003), movements between sell-side and buy-side 
firms are much less frequent.  The most common move among employer classes 
appears to be sell-side to independent, with 110 distinct analysts making this 
transition. 
 
We continue our analysis of forecast accuracy in Table 4 where we examine mobile 
analysts over their careers, as they move from one class of analyst-employer to 
another.  This table reports forecast error statistics for three broad classes of analyst-
employers (sell-side, buy-side and independent firms). The sample period is January 
1988 through May 2005. The sample includes all stocks representing 16 European 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United 
Kingdom).  The sample includes all stocks that mobile analysts research as they 
move from one employer class to another. 
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Table. 4: Forecast Errors by Mobile Analysts: All Stocks 
Panel A: Analysts Employed by Exactly Two Employer Classes 
 
Analyst-Employer 
Classes 
Sell-side 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Buy-side 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Indep. 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Mean 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
 
Distinct 
Analysts 
Sell-side – Buy-side 0.091 
(18,313) 
0.078 
(7,165) 
 0.013*** 
(1.71) 
45 
Sell-side – 
Independent 
0.086 
(162,793) 
 0.065 
(48,208) 
0.021* 
(9.55) 
194 
Buy-side – 
Independent 
 0.108 
(623) 
0.270 
(769) 
-0.162* 
(3.42) 
3 
Panel B: Analysts Employed by Three Employer Classes 
 
Analyst-Employer 
Classes 
Sell-side 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Buy-side 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Indep. 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Mean 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
 
Distinct 
Analysts 
Sell-side – Buy-side 0.105 
(132,422) 
0.197 
(5,885) 
 -0.092* 
(6.18) 
36 
Sell-side – 
Independent 
0.105 
(132,422) 
 0.055 
(13,169) 
0.050* 
(14.77) 
36 
Buy-side – 
Independent 
 0.197 
(5,885) 
0.055 
(13,169) 
0.142* 
(9.45) 
36 
Note: Forecast error is the difference between predicted earnings per share and actual earnings per 
share, scaled by the stock price at the time of the earnings announcement. The t-statistics that are 
reported test for differences in the mean forecast errors of analyst-employer class pairs.  N denotes 
the number of observations.  * (**) [***] denotes significance at 1% (5%) and [10%] levels. 
 
Panel A focuses on those analysts who work at exactly two employer classes, either 
sell-side and buy-side, sell-side and independent, or buy-side and independent firms.  
Here we see that for those 194 distinct analysts who work at both sell-side and 
independent employers, there is a statistically significant difference in the mean 
forecast errors associated with these two employer classes.  The mean forecast error 
for the 162,793 sell-side estimates is 8.6%; the mean forecast error for the 48,208 
buy-side estimates is 6.5%; the mean difference is 2.1% and it is statistically 
significant (with a t-stat of 9.55).   The results are similar for those analysts who 
work at both sell-side and buy-side employers.  For this group of 45 distinct 
analysts, the mean forecast error for the 18,313 sell-side estimates is 9.1%; the mean 
forecast error for the 7,165 buy-side estimates is 7.8%; the mean difference is 1.3%, 
which is marginally significant (with a t-stat of 1.71).   
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In Panel B of Table 4 we examine mobile analysts who work at three employer 
classes.  Here we see that for those 36 distinct analysts who work at sell-side, buy-
side and independent employers, there are statistically significant differences in the 
mean forecast errors associated with these three classes.  The mean forecast error for 
the 13,169 independent estimates is 5.5%; the mean forecast error for the 132,422 
sell-side estimates is 10.5%; and the mean forecast error for the 5,885 buy-side 
estimates is 19.7%.  Sell-side estimates are less accurate than independent estimates 
(with a mean difference of 5.0% and a t-stat of 14.77), but more accurate than buy-
side estimates (with a mean difference of -9.2% and a t-stat of 6.18).  Independent 
estimates are more accurate than buy-side estimates (with a mean difference of 
14.2% and a t-stat of 9.45). 
 
It is possible that mobile analysts generate more accurate forecasts when they are 
employed by independent firms than when they work at sell-side firms because the 
firms they research change as they move from one employer-class to another.  We 
attempt to address this concern in Table 5, where we restrict the sample to a sub-set 
of fixed stocks that mobile analysts research as they move from one employer class 
to another.  The table reports forecast error statistics for mobile analysts who move 
between sell-side, buy-side and independent employers.  The sample period is 
January 1988 through May 2005. The sample includes all stocks representing 16 
European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
and United Kingdom). Panel A focuses on those mobile analysts who work at 
exactly two employer-classes; Panel B examines very mobile analysts who work at 
all three employer-classes. 
 
Table 5: Forecast Errors by Mobile Analysts: Fixed Stocks 
Panel A: Analysts Employed by Exactly Two Employer Classes 
 
Analyst-Employer 
Classes 
Sell-side 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Buy-side 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Indep. 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Mean 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
 
Distinct 
Analysts 
Sell-side – Buy-side 0.085 
(3,822) 
0.076 
(3,073) 
 0.009 
(0.76) 
32 
Sell-side – Independent 0.066 
(82,687) 
 0.056 
(22,764) 
0.010* 
(3.83) 
150 
Buy-side – Independent  0.171 
(289) 
0.152 
(293) 
0.019 
(0.40) 
3 
Panel B: Analysts Employed by Three Employer Classes 
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Analyst-Employer 
Classes 
Sell-side 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Buy-side 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Indep. 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Mean 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
 
Distinct 
Analysts 
      
Sell-side – Buy-side 0.268 
(18,127) 
0.287 
(2,820) 
 -0.019 
(0.64) 
22 
Sell-side – Independent 0.268 
(18,127) 
 0.045 
(3,292) 
0.223* 
(20.31) 
22 
Buy-side – Independent  0.287 
(2,820) 
0.045 
(3,292) 
0.242* 
(8.89) 
22 
Note: Forecast error is the difference between predicted earnings per share and actual earnings per 
share, scaled by the stock price at the time of the earnings announcement. The t-statistics that are 
reported test for differences in the mean forecast errors of analyst-employer class pairs.  N denotes 
the number of observations.  * (**) [***] denotes significance at 1% (5%) and [10%] levels. 
 
In Panel A, we find that the mean forecast error associated with 22,764 independent 
estimates is significantly smaller than the mean forecast error associated with 82,687 
sell-side estimates generated by 150 distinct, mobile analysts for a fixed set of firms.  
The difference between the mean forecast errors of mobile analysts who work at 
both sell-side and independent firms is 1.0%.  This is statistically significant (with a 
t-stat of 3.83).  On the other hand, there is no statistically significant difference 
between the mean forecast errors associated with the 3,822 sell-side estimates and 
the 3,073 buy-side estimates generated by 32 distinct, mobile analysts who cover a 
fixed set of stocks.   Nor is there a statistically significant difference between the 
buy-side and independent estimates generated by 3 mobile analysts. 
 
In Panel B, we find statistically significant differences between the 18,127 sell-side 
estimates and the 3,292 independent estimates generated by 22 distinct, very mobile 
analysts who cover a fixed set of stocks.  The difference between the mean forecast 
errors for sell-side and independent estimates is 22.3%, which is statistically 
significant (with a t-stat of 20.31).  We also find statistically significant differences 
between the 2,820 buy-side estimates and the 3,292 independent estimates generated 
by these same 22 distinct, very mobile analysts.   The difference between the mean 
forecast errors for buy-side and independent estimates is 24.2%, which is 
statistically significant (with a t-stat of 8.89).   
 
Collectively, Tables 4 and 5 reveal that when analysts move between sell-side or 
buy-side firms and independent firms, they generate more accurate earnings 
forecasts while they are employed by independent firms, especially if they have 
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experience at all three employer classes.  Moreover, differences in coverage do not 
drive this result.  One conclusion we can draw is that differences in culture, or 
reward systems across analyst-employer-classes may impact analysts’ behavior.  
The analysts most susceptible to these effects could be those that are mobile.   
 
We continue our analysis of forecast accuracy in Table 6, where we seek to 
determine whether the differences between sell-side, buy-side, and independent 
mean forecast errors for very mobile analysts (i.e., those who work at all three 
employer-classes during their careers) are related to the employer class at which an 
analyst begins her career.  Table 6 reports forecast error statistics for mobile analysts 
who have worked at sell-side, buy-side and independent employers.  The sample 
period is January 1988 through May 2005. The sample includes all stocks 
representing 16 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom).  We restrict the sample to a fixed set of 
stocks that mobile analysts research as they move from one employer class to 
another.  In Panel A, we sort on the analyst’s employer class at the start of her 
career; in Panel B, we sort on the analyst’s employer class at the time an estimate is 
made.3 
   
Table 6: Forecast Errors by Mobile Analysts: Career Start 
Panel A: Sort on Career Start 
 
Career Start 
Sell-side 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Buy-side 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Indep. 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Mean 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
Sell-side Start     
     
Sell-side – Buy-side 
0.296 
(15,081) 
0.295 
(2,274)  
0.001 
(0.18) 
Sell-side – Independent 0.296 
(15,081) 
 0.034 
(2,519) 
0.262* 
(21.00) 
Buy-side – Independent  
0.295 
(2,274) 
0.034 
(2,519) 
0.261* 
(8.47) 
Buy-side Start     
     
3   We assume an analyst begins her career at the employer-class associated with the first occurrence of 
her name in the I/B/E/S database.  We cannot be certain where an analyst begins her career because 
I/B/E/S does not purport to comprehensively track all sell-side, buy-side and independent analysts. 
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Sell-side – Buy-side 
0.057 
(1,556) 
0.049 
(162)  
0.008 
(1.03) 
Sell-side – Independent 0.057 
(1,556) 
 0.059 
(387) 
-0.002 
(0.28) 
Buy-side – Independent  
0.049 
(162) 
0.059 
(387) 
-0.010 
(0.87) 
Independent Start     
     
Sell-side – Buy-side 
 
0.222 
(1,387) 
0.358 
(360) 
 
-0.136 
(1.53) 
Sell-side – Independent 
0.222 
(1,387)  
0.110 
(323) 
0.112* 
(2.69) 
Buy-side – Independent  
0.358 
(360) 
0.110 
(323) 
0.248* 
(2.84) 
Note: Forecast error is the difference between predicted earnings per share and actual earnings per 
share, scaled by the stock price at the time of the earnings announcement. The t-statistics that are 
reported test for differences in the mean forecast errors of analyst-employer class pairs.  N denotes 
the number of observations.  * (**) [***] denotes significance at 1% (5%) and [10%] levels. 
 
The results in Panel A suggest that analysts who start their careers at buy-side 
employers do not suffer from institutional biases.  The differences between the mean 
forecast errors associated with the 1,556 sell-side, 162 buy-side and 387 independent 
estimates made by these analysts are not statistically significant.  On the other hand, 
analysts who start their careers at either sell-side or independent employers appear to 
be susceptible to institutional biases as they move from one employer class to 
another.  For example, focusing on analysts who begin their careers at sell-side 
employers, we find a statistically significant (t-stat = 21.00) 26.2% difference in the 
mean forecast errors associated with the 15,081 sell-side and 2,519 independent 
estimates.  Likewise, for those analysts who begin their careers at independent 
employers, we find a statistically significant (t-stat = 2.69) 11.2% difference in the 
mean forecast errors associated with their 1,387 sell-side and 323 independent 
estimates. 
Table 6: Forecast Errors by Mobile Analysts: Career Start (cont’d) 
Panel B: Sort on Analyst-Employer Class 
 
 
Analyst-Employer Class 
Sell-side 
Origin 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Buy-side 
Origin 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Indep. 
Origin 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Mean 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
Sell-side estimates     
Sell-side – Buy-side Origin 0.296 0.057  0.239* 
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(15,081) (1,556) (19.59) 
Sell-side – Independent Origin 
0.296 
(15,081) 
 
0.222 
(1,387) 
0.074** 
(2.21) 
Buy-side – Independent Origin  
0.057 
(1,556) 
0.222 
(1,387) 
0.165* 
(5.30) 
Buy-side estimates     
Sell-side – Buy-side Origin 0.296 
(2,274) 
0.049 
(162) 
 0.247* 
(7.73) 
Sell-side – Independent Origin 
0.296 
(2,274) 
 
0.358 
(360) 
-0.062 
(0.74) 
Buy-side – Independent Origin  
0.049 
(162) 
0.358 
(360) 
-0.309* 
(5.30) 
 
Independent estimates 
    
     
Sell-side – Buy-side Origin 
0.034 
(2,519) 
0.059 
(387) 
 
-0.025* 
(3.41) 
Sell-side – Independent Origin 0.034 
(2,519) 
 0.110 
(323) 
-0.076* 
(2.67) 
Buy-side – Independent Origin  
0.059 
(387) 
0.110 
(323) 
0.051*** 
(1.75) 
Note: Forecast error is the difference between predicted earnings per share and actual earnings per 
share, scaled by the stock price at the time of the earnings announcement. The t-statistics that are 
reported test for differences in the mean forecast errors of analyst-employer class pairs.  N denotes 
the number of observations.  * (**) [***] denotes significance at 1% (5%) and [10%] levels. 
 
In Panel B, we find that sell-side and buy-side analysts produce more accurate 
forecasts if they begin their careers at buy-side employers.  For example, the 5.7% 
mean forecast error associated with the 1,556 sell-side estimates made by analysts 
who started their careers at buy-side employers is statistically smaller than the 
29.6% mean forecast error associated with the 15,081 sell-side estimates made by 
analysts who started their careers at sell-side employers.  Analysts who begin their 
careers at buy-side employers produce 162 buy-side and 2,274 sell-side estimates 
with mean forecast errors of 4.9% and 29.6% respectively.  The difference between 
the two mean forecast errors is 24.7% and it is statistically significant (t-stat = 7.73). 
 
In contrast, independent analysts produce more accurate forecasts if they begin their 
careers at sell-side employers.  These analysts generate 2,519 estimates with a mean 
forecast error of 3.4%.  This is statistically smaller than the 5.9% mean forecast 
error associated with the 387 estimates made by independent analysts who started 
their careers at buy-side employers and the 11.0% mean forecast error associated 
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with the 323 estimates made by independent analysts who started their careers at 
independent employers. 
 
The results in Table 6 support the idea that an analyst’s accuracy is related to the 
employer class at which she begins her career. 
 
We continue our analysis with an examination of forecast errors for newly public 
firms in Table 7.  Here, we examine all IPOs originated in 16 European countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom) 
during the sample period, January 1988 through May 2005.  We compare the 
earnings forecast errors attributable to analysts employed by the sell-side firms that 
act as lead underwriters for the newly public firms to the forecast errors associated 
with the buy-side and independent analysts that research those firms.  Panel A 
covers all estimates over the sample period; Panel B examines estimates made up to 
five years after a company goes public; Panel C covers the period following the 5 
year anniversary of an IPO. 
 
Table 7: Forecast Errors for IPOs 
Panel A: All Years 
 
 
Analyst-Employer 
Classes 
Sell-side 
Lead 
Mean FE 
(N) 
 
Buy-side 
Mean FE 
(N) 
 
Indep. 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Sell-side 
Other 
Mean FE 
(N) 
 
Mean 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
      
Sell-side – Buy-side 0.218 
(10,717) 
0.146 
(1,739) 
  0.072* 
(3.45) 
Sell-side – Independent 0.218 
(10,717) 
 0.128 
(7,975) 
 0.090* 
(7.53) 
Buy-side – Independent  0.146 
(1,739) 
0.128 
(7,975) 
 0.018 
(0.90) 
Sell-side Lead – Sell-side Other 0.218 
(10,717) 
  0.205 
(112,678) 
0.013 
(1.35) 
Table 7: Forecast Errors for IPOs (cont’d) 
Panel B: First Five Years Following an IPO 
 
 
Analyst-Employer 
Sell-side 
Lead 
Mean FE 
 
Buy-side 
Mean FE 
 
Indep. 
Mean FE 
Sell-side 
Other 
Mean FE 
 
Mean 
Difference 
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Classes (N) (N) (N) (N) (t-stat) 
      
Sell-side – Buy-side 0.209 
(5,197) 
0.077 
(705) 
  0.132* 
(9.38) 
Sell-side – Independent 0.209 
(5,197) 
 0.085 
(2,935) 
 0.124* 
(9.99) 
Buy-side – Independent  0.077 
(705) 
0.085 
(2,935) 
 -0.008 
(0.68) 
      
Sell-side Lead – Sell-side Other 0.209 
(5,197) 
  0.173 
(38,043) 
0.036* 
(3.12) 
Panel C: Post-Five Year Anniversary of an IPO 
 
 
Analyst-Employer 
Classes 
Sell-side 
Lead 
Mean FE 
(N) 
 
Buy-side 
Mean FE 
(N) 
 
Indep. 
Mean FE 
(N) 
Sell-side 
Other 
Mean FE 
(N) 
 
Mean 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
      
Sell-side – Buy-side 0.227 
(5,520) 
0.193 
(1,034) 
  0.034 
(0.98) 
Sell-side – Independent 0.227 
(5,520) 
 0.153 
(5,040) 
 0.074* 
(3.94) 
Buy-side – Independent  0.193 
(1,034) 
0.153 
(5,040) 
 0.040 
(1.22) 
      
Sell-side Lead – Sell-side 
Other 
0.227 
(5,520) 
  0.221 
(74,635) 
0.006 
(0.39) 
Note: Forecast error is the difference between predicted earnings per share and actual earnings per 
share, scaled by the stock price at the time of the earnings announcement. The t-statistics that are 
reported test for differences in the mean forecast errors of analyst-employer class pairs.  N denotes 
the number of observations.  * (**) [***] denotes significance at 1% (5%) and [10%] levels. 
 
In Panel A, we see that analysts employed by lead underwriters show an optimistic 
bias in their forecasts for newly public companies.  The mean forecast error for the 
10,717 estimates of analysts employed by lead underwriters is 21.8%.  This is 
statistically larger than the mean forecast error associated with the 1,739 estimates 
of analysts employed by buy-side firms (14.6%) or the mean forecast error 
associated with the 7,975 estimates of analysts employed by independent firms 
(12.8%).   
 
The optimistic bias of analysts employed by lead underwriters persists over the five-
year period following an IPO.  In Panel B, we see that these analysts are more 
optimistic than buy-side, independent and sell-side analysts whose employers do not 
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act as lead underwriters.  However, following the five-year anniversary of an IPO, 
the forecast errors of all sell-side analysts converge.  In Panel C, we find no 
difference between the mean forecast errors associated with the 5,520 estimates 
generated by sell-side analysts whose employers act as lead underwriters and the 
74,635 estimates generated by sell-side analysts whose employers do not act as lead 
underwriters.  The results in Table 7 are consistent with underwriting activity being 
a major cause of sell-side analysts’ bias and optimism. 
 
We complete our analysis by examining the determinants of analyst forecast errors 
in Table 8. The table reports regression coefficients and Newey-West adjusted t-
statistics in parentheses. The sample period is January 1988 through May 2005. The 
sample includes all stocks representing 16 European countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom).   
Table 8: Regressions Explaining Forecast Errors 
Panel A: All Stocks 
        
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Ln (ME) 
-
0.0034* 
(3.51)  
   
-0.0020*** 
(1.96) 
-0.0020** 
(2.04) 
-0.0019*** 
(1.85) 
Residual 
Analyst 
Coverage 
 
-
0.0261* 
(4.06) 
 
  -0.0387* 
(5.08) 
-0.0315* 
(4.65) 
-0.0343* 
(5.46) 
Analyst 
Productivity 
 
  
-
0.0008* 
(10.00) 
 
-0.0009* 
(10.89) 
-0.0008* 
(10.68) 
-0.0008* 
(10.87) 
Forecast 
Immediacy 
 
   0.0002* 
(3.40) 
0.0002* 
(2.88) 
0.0002* 
(2.84) 
0.0002* 
(2.87) 
Sell-side 
Dummy 
    
0.0235** 
(2.16) 
 
  
Buy-side 
Dummy 
     0.0169 
(0.84)  
 
Independent 
Dummy 
      
-0.0532* 
(5.97) 
 
Sell-side  
Career Start 
    0.0524* 
(4.53) 
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Buy-side  
Career Start      
-0.0734* 
(6.52) 
 
 
Independent 
Career Start 
      
-0.0323** 
(2.04) 
  
R2 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.004 
 
0.001 
 
0.006 
 
0.006 
 
0.006 
 
 
 
Table 8: Regressions Explaining Forecast Errors (cont’d) 
Panel B: Fixed Stocks 
        
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Ln (ME) 
-0.0063 
(0.76) 
 
   
0.0107 
(1.28) 
0.0106 
(1.16) 
0.0039 
(0.46) 
Residual 
Analyst 
Coverage 
 
0.0713 
(1.41) 
 
  
-0.0703 
(1.40) 
-0.0418 
(0.79) 
-
0.0894*** 
(1.79) 
Analyst 
Productivity 
 
  
-
0.0039* 
(7.72) 
 -0.0044* 
(7.45) 
-0.0041* 
(7.94) 
-0.0036* 
(7.13) 
Forecast 
Immediacy 
 
   0.0013* 
(3.26) 
0.0010* 
(2.79) 
0.0010* 
(2.62) 
0.0011* 
(2.93) 
 
Sell-side 
Dummy     
0.3071* 
(6.40) 
 
  
Buy-side 
Dummy      
-0.2046* 
(4.05) 
 
 
Independent 
Dummy 
      
-0.2953* 
(7.08) 
 
Sell-side 
Career Start 
    
0.1791* 
(2.58) 
 
  
Buy-side 
Career Start      
-0.3432* 
(7.69) 
 
 
Independent       -0.0546 
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Career Start (0.61) 
 
R2 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.015 
 
0.007 
 
0.035 
 
0.029 
 
0.026 
 
 
Note: Forecast error is the difference between predicted earnings per share and actual earnings per 
share, scaled by the stock price at the time of the earnings announcement. We regress analyst 
forecast errors on the following set of explanatory variables: ln(ME), the natural logarithm of the 
market value of the equity; residual analyst coverage, where the residuals come from month-by-
month cross-sectional regressions of log (1 + # of analysts) on  log (firm size); analyst 
productivity (the number of distinct firms that an analyst researches in the year a forecast is 
made); forecast immediacy (the number of days from the first earnings estimate to the forecast 
revision); dummy variables for sell-side, buy-side and independent analyst-employers; dummy 
variables for the analyst-employer class at which an analyst begins her career.  * (**) [***] 
denotes significance at 1% (5%) and [10%] levels. 
 
In Panel A, we include all stocks covered by mobile analysts employed by three 
employer classes.  In Panel B, we restrict the sample to a sub-set of fixed stocks that 
mobile analysts research as they move from one employer class to another.  The 
dependent variable is our measure of analyst forecast error.  The independent 
regressors include a measure of firm size, residual analyst coverage (defined in 
Section III), analyst productivity (the number of distinct firms that an analyst 
researches in the year a forecast is made), forecast immediacy (the number of days 
from the first earnings estimate to the forecast revision), dummy variables for sell-
side, buy-side and independent analyst-employers and dummy variables for the 
analyst-employer class at which an analyst begins her career.  The uni-variate 
regressions (Models 1 – 4) in Panel A show that forecast errors are positively related 
to forecast immediacy, and negatively related to firm size, residual analyst coverage 
and analyst productivity.  The multi-variate regressions (Models 5 – 7) in Panel A 
show similar results.    Most importantly, forecast errors increase when the analyst is 
employed by a sell-side firm and decrease when the analyst is employed by an 
independent firm.  The analyst-employer class at which an analyst begins her career 
is also important in explaining forecast errors.  Forecast errors increase when the 
analyst begins her career at a sell-side firm, and decrease when the analyst begins 
her career at either a buy-side or independent firm.  All of these dummy variables 
are statistically significant in explaining the magnitude of analyst forecast errors. 
 
In Panel B, we repeat the analysis using the fixed set of stocks that mobile analysts 
research as they move among the sell-side, buy-side and independent employer 
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classes.  Here we find similar results, except that firm size is no longer a significant 
factor in explaining forecast errors.  Forecast errors increase when the analyst is 
employed by a sell-side firm and decrease when the analyst is employed by either a 
buy-side or independent firm.  Additionally, forecast errors increase when the 
analyst begins her career at a sell-side firm, and decrease when the analyst begins 
her career at a buy-side firm.  For this subset of observations, the independent career 
start dummy variable is not statistically significant in explaining forecast errors. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the accuracy of equity analysts who provide earnings forecasts 
for European companies.  We attempt to disentangle the institutional factors that 
might bias analysts’ forecasts (such as conflicts of interest attributable to analyst-
employer activities) from individual factors that might impact accuracy (such as 
firm selection, analyst productivity and forecast age) by studying a subset of mobile 
analysts who move among analyst-employer classes over their careers.  We consider 
three classes of analyst-employers: sell-side firms, buy-side firms and independent 
firms. We test for differences in the forecast accuracy of analyst-employer classes. 
 
We find that analysts who research European companies exhibit the same optimistic 
bias in their earnings forecasts as their peers who examine U.S. companies.  Over 
the period 1988 – 2005, the mean forecast error is 13.6%.  Independent analysts 
produce the most accurate forecasts and sell-side analysts produce the least accurate 
forecasts.  The difference in accuracy between these two classes is statistically 
significant.  We also find that forecast accuracy varies substantially within the sell-
side and independent analyst-employer classes.   Analysts affiliated with active 
underwriters are more accurate and less optimistic than analysts affiliated with 
syndicate members.  On the other hand, analysts who are employed by pure research 
firms are less accurate and more optimistic than analysts employed by non-
underwriting banks or brokers.   
 
We find that when analysts move between sell-side employers and independent 
employers, they issue more accurate forecasts while they are employed by 
independent firms.  Moreover, these differences persist when we hold constant the 
set of firms these mobile analysts research. These results are consistent with 
institutional factors contributing to bias. 
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We find that an analyst’s accuracy is related to the employer class at which she 
begins her career.  Analysts who start their careers at buy-side employers do not 
suffer from institutional biases.  On the other hand, analysts who start their careers at 
either sell-side or independent employers appear to be susceptible to institutional 
biases as they move from one employer class to another. 
 
The optimistic bias of sell-side analysts appears to be related to underwriting 
activity.  We show that analysts employed by lead underwriters produce less 
accurate forecasts for newly public companies than do either buy-side or 
independent analysts.  The optimistic bias persists for a five-year period following 
an IPO. 
 
We examine the determinants of analyst forecast errors.  Consistent with 
institutional biases impacting analyst accuracy, we find that forecast errors increase 
when the analyst is employed by a sell-side firm and decrease when the analyst is 
employed by an independent firm.   
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